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Analyzing a firm from an ESG perspective allows pension fund managers to potentially 
identify risk exposures that would be missed using just traditional investment analysis. The types 
of risks most likely to be uncovered using an ESG lens can be categorized as reputation risk, human 
capital management risk, litigation risk, regulatory risk, corruption risk, and climate risk. In 
addition, the components of risk (e.g., systematic risks, tracking error, and downside risks) can be 
affected differentially by ESG issues. Some of the risks, notably climate risk, have changed in 
importance over time and even for others, such as corruption risk, the ESG lens can provide a 
heightened way in which to examine the effects of the risks on pension portfolios.1  
Due to their long-term horizons, pension funds face enhanced exposures to the long-lived 
effects of many ESG risks, especially those that arise from climate change. In addition, the long-
term nature of pension funds combined with the potential consequences of being underfunded 
leaves their portfolios, particularly those for defined benefit plans, more exposed to the 
repercussions of downside risks, that is, to sharp declines in asset values. Specifically, many 
pension funds face large liabilities towards their beneficiaries, and the failure to meet those 
liabilities because of significant negative ESG-related events carries large penalties. Thus, with 
wealth protection being an important dimension, pension funds should have a strong preference to 
identify and address ESG-related downside risks. Downside risks have also become important for 
pension funds from a more general portfolio construction perspective, as mounting evidence shows 
that asset returns are typically skewed. Left-skewed asset returns in particular violate a key 
assumption of the standard mean-variance investment framework, and asset allocation models 
have in turn been developed that explicitly incorporate the resultant downside risks.  
In this paper, we first review different types and sources of ESG-related risks, with a focus 





on the importance of climate-related downside risks and how such risks are priced in financial 
markets. We also demonstrate whether and how institutional investors address climate-related 
risks in the investment process.   
 
Types of ESG-related Risks  
Reputation risk. ESG issues pose significant reputational risks to the firms in which pension funds 
invest. The increasingly public discussion of firms’ ESG activities through internet media sources 
and social media have created the possibility that management missteps in these areas result in 
material effects on firms’ reputations. Moreover, the effects of reputational risk on market value 
can be quite large given that estimates of the value of intangible assets for firms in the S&P 500 
have increased from about 17 percent in 1975 to 90 percent in 2020 (Ocean Tomo 2020).2 In a 
recent survey, firms were asked to rank their top three most important subclasses of intangible 
assets beyond intellectual property and information assets (Ponemon 2020). Among the top 
responses, 69 percent of the firms stated their third-party relationships, such as with customers, 
suppliers, vendors, and supply chains, and 47 percent stated their brand as being the top three most 
important subclasses of intangible assets. These two types of intangible assets would be 
particularly vulnerable to reputational penalties imposed on a firm because of ESG controversies 
or poor ESG practices.  
Further evidence that ESG reputation risk can be significant is reflected in the fact that 
most of the ESG ratings agencies now include some type of controversy rating to ensure that their 
client investors are aware of the existing controversies that can affect a firm’s reputation. For 
example, Sustainalytics states that ESG controversies ratings identify ‘companies involved in 





impact on stakeholders or the environment’ (Sustainalytics 2021: 1). In fact, because of their 
contributions to a firm’s ESG risk exposures, the controversies ratings have become a central part 
of most ESG ratings services. For example, a study by the EU Commission on sustainability-
related ratings (European Commission 2020) has a section on ‘Controversy Ratings.’ This section 
specifically points to the different ESG ratings agencies, who provide news sentiment and 
controversy alerts so that investors become aware of the behaviors and practices of firms and 
countries that are not compatible with the investors’ policies, and that could lead to reputational 
risks.3 For some of the rating agencies, a firm’s controversy level is a significant part of the overall 
ESG score; for others it is reported as a separate score. In addition, for one agency, RepRisk, the 
controversy issues represent the total score. The EU Commission’s study points out that 
‘Increasingly sustainability-related ratings providers are factoring controversies, allegations and 
negative news into their assessments of companies as a means of layering in risk exposure and 
signalling (potential) poor management’ (European Commission 2020: 99). Again, these 
controversy ratings are consistent with the argument that using an ESG lens allows investors to go 
beyond traditional valuation models to assess risks that would not be captured by those models.  
The controversy ratings have allowed ESG rating agencies to give warnings, thus helping 
investors assess, or even avoid, firms with greater ESG risk exposure. For example, MSCI argues 
that in the two years prior to the emissions scandal, they had flagged Volkswagen on controversies 
related to product and service quality, bribery and fraud, and collective bargaining (MSCI 2015).   
Human capital management risk. Although human capital management risk has long been an 
aspect of ESG risk, it has come under heightened scrutiny during the COVID-19 pandemic because 
the pandemic highlighted firms’ treatments of their employees. That is, the crisis highlighted how 





performance. Recent evidence shows that investors became more concerned about how firms treat 
their human capital (Albuquerque et al. 2020; Cheema-Fox et al. 2020).  
Litigation risk. Litigation related to ESG issues can increase for firms considered to have poor 
ESG practices. For example, a number of jurisdictions (counties and cities) have filed lawsuits 
against oil firms, seeking compensation for climate change damages (e.g., New York City, 
Oakland, San Francisco, Boulder, San Mateo County, and Marin County). Recently, PG&E had to 
file for bankruptcy as a result of legal claims related to the Californian wildfires exceeding $10 
billion. Similarly, BP had to pay more than $18 billion to settle legal claims related to the oil spill 
at its Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig.4   
Regulatory risk. Regulatory risk recognizes that new (costly) regulations related to ESG can arise, 
and such regulations have been increasing over time.  For example, according to an October 2018 
report by Datamaran, during the previous three years ESG-related regulations grew by more than 
100 percent in the UK, US, and Canada (Datamaran 2018). Recently, the EU established new 
regulation that requires all financial market participants and financial advisors to disclose specific 
information on their approaches to the integration of a ‘sustainability risk’ into their investment 
decisions. They also have to disclose the extent to which their decision-making process and their 
investment products take into account the consideration of ‘sustainability factor’ adverse impacts. 
A ‘sustainability risk’ is defined as an ‘environmental, social or governance event or condition 
that, if it occurs, could cause an actual or potential material negative impact on the value of the 
investment.’5 Regulatory risk is a particularly important component of climate risk (along with 
physical risk and technological risk) and will be discussed in more detail below. 
Corruption risk. The risks related to corruption lead to both financial and reputational risks. Beck 





institutional investors consider corruption risk to be a highly important risk. In a recent PwC survey 
of institutional investors, the investors identified anti-corruption along with climate change as their 
top two ESG concerns (PwC 2016).  
Climate risk. As pointed out by Litterman (2016) and Krueger et al. (2020), climate risk can 
negatively affect asset values, particularly for long-term investors such as pension funds. Thus, 
climate risk is an important consideration for the asset allocation and risk management of pension 
funds. Climate risk can originate from physical risks (e.g., sea level rise, storms, or extreme 
temperature), regulatory risks (regulation to combat climate change), or technological risks 
(technological climate-related disruption), all of which can be financially material. The problem is 
that climate risk can be difficult to price and hedge due to its systematic nature, the fact that there 
does not exist sufficient disclosure by many firms that could be incorporated into the risk 
consideration, and the difficulty in finding suitable hedging instruments. Not surprisingly, 
institutional investors, corporate executives and policy makers have shown increased concerns 
regarding climate risk and climate risk disclosure. Below we provide more discussion of different 
climate risks and their role for pension funds.  
 
Risk Components and ESG-related Risks 
Systematic risk. Systematic risk, that is, the risk that a firm has in common with the market, can 
contain ESG elements. Notably, Bénabou and Tirole (2010) point out that firms with higher ESG 
characteristics may have different systematic risk exposures, either due to their resilience in 
periods of crisis or because the firms face a specific ESG risk factor. Given these systematic risk 
exposures, the firms would be expected to require different risk premia, and consequently, have 





this idea. In their model, firms have a choice to engage in ESG activities in order to increase their 
product differentiation and enhance their profits. The primary prediction arising from the model is 
that better ESG activities decrease systematic risk and increase firm value. The authors empirically 
test this model and find support for the predictions.6 In further empirical tests, they show that the 
profits for high-ESG-scoring firms are less correlated with the business cycle than the profits for 
low-ESG-scoring firms.7 
Tracking error. Integrating ESG considerations into a portfolio process does not always reduce 
all components of portfolio risk as omitting firms or industries because of ESG concerns (e.g., 
negative screening) can lead to increased tracking error in a portfolio (e.g., Branch et al. 2019). 
Institutional investors that track an index or are evaluated relative to an index may in turn be 
concerned about ESG-related track error.    
Downside risk. For some investors, firms with higher ESG profiles provide a type of protection 
against downside risk because these firms are considered to be better managed and in turn have 
lower exposure to ESG risks. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the tail-risk measures are 
closely linked to ESG risk, as firms with better ESG performance are less vulnerable to firm-
specific negative events (e.g., Diemont et al. 2016; Krueger 2015). Because of this, one of the 
primary arguments for integrating ESG analysis into portfolio investment decisions is the claim 
that such integration will mitigate risk, particularly downside risk. Among the most potentially 
devastating risks are risks that arise from controversies. These controversies may arise from the E 
of ESG (e.g., emissions, toxic wastes, and environmental disasters) or the S (e.g., human rights, 
labor rights, customer privacy, and product safety) or the G (e.g., bribery, fraud).  
Two recent cases where ESG-related downside risks materialized are the PG&E 





social and governance risk, and the Wells Fargo series of scandals, which were primarily social 
risks, given the effects on customers, but also include governance risks. Both cases involved more 
than a single event and ex post analyses of the subsequent events indicate that these events had 
large negative effects on the stock prices of the two firms, even after controlling for stock market 
movements. These two events provide examples of the ESG-related downside risks that can occur. 
In both cases, pension funds lost significant amounts of money from their investments in these 
firms.    
 
Climate-related Downside Risks  
Importance of climate-related downside risks. In recent years, there has been an increasing 
amount of research on the financial effects of climate risk, which should be of particular relevance 
to pension fund managers and sponsors because of the potential portfolio effects. Researchers have 
provided theoretical evidence that climate risk should have a large effect on financial markets and 
may be mispriced (e.g., Daniel et al. 2016; Bansal et al. 2016); empirical evidence that equity 
markets underprice climate risk and underreact to it (Hong et al. 2017); and empirical evidence 
that extreme weather uncertainty affects financial markets (e.g., Kruttli et al. 2021). Further, 
Pankratz et al. (2021) show that firms with increased exposure to high temperatures face reductions 
in revenues and operating income. With regard to firm value, evidence suggests that increased 
climate risk disclosure affects firm value (Krueger 2018); that firms’ exposures to climate risk 
predicts their stock returns (Kumar et al. 2019); that investors demand greater compensation from 
firms with higher carbon emissions (Bolton and Kacperczyk 2021); and that exposure to regulatory 





Another possible concern for pension fund portfolio managers and sponsors lies in the 
evidence that potential sea level rise is already affecting real estate prices (e.g., Bernstein et al. 
2019; Baldauf et al. 2020; Keys and Mulder 2020).8 These potential consequences of climate risk 
make it even more difficult for pension fund managers, because climate risk is quite difficult to 
hedge (Andersson et al. 2016). 
This broad base of evidence suggests that institutional investors, and pension fund 
managers in particular, should be worried about climate change and the resulting risks for their 
portfolio firms. Direct evidence supporting the claim that climate risks are an important concern 
for investors comes from Krueger et al. (2020) (KSS henceforth). KSS conduct an international 
survey among institutional investors, with 23 percent identifying as being asset managers, 22 
percent banks, 17 percent pension funds, 15 percent insurance companies, and 8 percent mutual 
funds. There was a range of institution sizes but the majority had assets under management of at 
least $1 billion, including 11 percent that had assets of more than $100 billion. The sample was 
global, with 32 percent located in the US, 17 percent in the UK and Ireland, 12 percent in Canada, 
11 percent in Germany, 7 percent in Italy, and 5 percent in Spain (the rest are located elsewhere in 
the world).  
In questions regarding the importance of climate risks relative to other risks, as Figure 6.1 
shows, most of the survey participants believe financial risk to be the most important, and climate 
risks, among other risks, to be relatively less important. However, on an absolute basis, the 
responses reported in KSS suggest that climate risks are deemed to have material financial 
consequences for portfolio firms. Moreover, in a question about their temperature expectations, 
the majority of respondents indicated that they expect a rise in global temperatures, and a 





Further, their responses show that the majority believe that some climate risks, such as regulatory 
risk, have already been materializing. This is strong evidence, given theoretical evidence regarding 
the uncertainty of the time horizon over which climate risks would be materializing (e.g., Barnett 
et al. 2020; Andersson et al. 2016).  
Figure 1 here 
Pricing of climate-related downside risks. Consistent with KSS’s evidence that investors worry 
about climate risks, Ilhan et al. (2021) (ISV henceforth) demonstrate that uncertainty about 
climate-related downside risks began to be priced in financial markets. They argue that regulatory 
measures to limit carbon emissions, for example, in the form of a carbon tax or limits on emissions, 
will have a significant financial impact on firms that produce large carbon emissions. Notably, for 
these types of firms, regulation that limits carbon emissions can lead to substantial increases in the 
cost of doing business or even to stranded assets. If banks reduce funding to carbon-intense firms, 
for instance, because of climate-related capital requirements, such firms may also experience 
constraints when financing future investment activities. At the same time, it is highly uncertain 
when and to what extent carbon-intense firms will be affected by future regulation. This climate 
policy uncertainty poses a challenge for investors in terms of adequately assessing how and when 
climate regulation will affect firms.  
ISV address these issues empirically by exploring whether the option market prices climate 
policy uncertainty. Specifically, for their sample of S&P 500 firms, they test whether protection 
against downside tail risks through put options is more expensive for firms that emit more carbon. 
The benefit of examining traded options is that options-based measures reflect market participants’ 
expectations of risk. Their primary measure to capture downside risk, SlopeD, reflects the 





money put options are more expensive, and this reflects a relatively higher option protection cost 
against left-tail risks.  
ISV provide a series of results documenting that climate policy uncertainty is priced in the 
option market. ISV’s regression estimates, reproduced in Table 6.1, show that an increase in a 
firm’s (log industry) carbon intensity by one-standard deviation increases SlopeD by 0.014 (see 
Column 1). This increase is meaningful as it equals about 10 percent of the standard deviation of 
SlopeD. Overall, ISV’s evidence suggests that put options of carbon-intense firms are relatively 
more expensive, in particular for the far-left tail, as they protect investors against downside risks 
originating from climate policy uncertainty. ISV also show that the effect of carbon intensities on 
downside risk is amplified when the public pays relatively high attention to climate change topics. 
The reason is that public attention to climate change topics increases the likelihood that pro-climate 
policies are adopted due to public scrutiny.  
Table 1 here 
ISV use President Trump’s election in 2016 as an event that reduced short-term climate 
policy uncertainty. While Trump signaled in his election campaign that climate-related policies 
would not become stricter, his opponent Hillary Clinton instead promised climate-friendly 
policies. ISV’s tests in turn exploit that President Trump’s election meant no change in the status 
quo of US climate regulation, whereas the election of Clinton would have implied the opposite. 
These arguments imply that for carbon-intense firms, the cost of insurance against downside risks 
associated with climate policy uncertainty should have declined after the election of President 
Trump. Supporting this prediction, Table 6.2 demonstrates ISV’s result that SlopeD for very 





relative to less carbon-intense firms—a reduction equal to 12 percent of SlopeD’s standard 
deviation.   
Table 2 here 
Addressing climate-related downside risks. Given the uncertainty surrounding climate risk and 
ISV’s evidence that climate-related downside risks are being priced, it is perhaps not surprising 
that investors started to address climate risks in their investment processes. In their global survey, 
KSS also asked the institutional investors which approaches, if any, they had taken to incorporate 
climate risks into their investment processes (they asked about the previous five years). The 
responses are provided in Table 6.3. As the table indicates, all but 7 percent of the investors have 
chosen ‘some’ approach for incorporating climate risk management into their investment process.9 
The most common approach taken by the institutional investors (38%) is to analyze the carbon 
footprint of their portfolio firms. Further, 29 percent of the respondents attempt to reduce the 
carbon footprint of their investment portfolios. Another common approach, followed by 35 percent 
of the investors, is to analyze the stranded asset risks in their portfolios, that is, the risk of having 
an asset lose economic value earlier than anticipated due to climate change effects. Again, some 
of the respondents (23%) take this approach a step further by not only analyzing their portfolios’ 
stranded asset risks, but also trying to reduce these risks (23%).  
Over a third of the investors (34%) take an indirect approach because they believe that their 
general portfolio diversification serves as one method to incorporate climate risks into their 
portfolio process. In contrast, some investors (26%) take a direct approach by employing valuation 
models that specifically incorporate climate risks. Other direct approaches employed are to submit 
shareholder proposals to portfolio firms (25%), to hedge against climate risks (25%), or to employ 





respondents, the least frequently used method of dealing with climate risks is divestment, which 
is employed by 20 percent. The respondents could select more than one approach, and in further 
analyses we find that those who employ more approaches are those who are more concerned about 
the financial costs of climate change, those with longer horizons and who have a larger fraction of 
their portfolios managed using ESG analysis. Given the wide variety of approaches commonly 
employed, it appears that the investment industry is still trying to find out how to most effectively 
manage climate risks; this likely also applies to pension funds.  
Table 3 here 
As we discuss below, Hoepner et al. (2021) provide evidence that shareholder engagement 
by investors can reduce downside ESG risks, especially those originating from climate change. 
The survey by KSS thus also asked investors what measures of engagement over climate risk issues 
they have taken with any of their portfolio firms (during the past five years). Similar to the results 
in Table 6.3 of the heterogeneity of approaches taken to incorporate climate-related risks into their 
investment processes, the answers to this question, provided in Table 6.4, show that the 
respondents do not employ a unique approach to their engagement strategy, but that they employ 
a number of different methods. Moreover, the survey investors have a generally high level of 
engagement with their portfolio firms, as only 16 percent did not have any engagements over the 
period.10 The most often used channel is to hold discussions with firm management regarding the 
financial consequences of climate risks for firms, which is used by 43 percent of the respondents. 
Thirty-two percent of the respondents propose specific actions to management on climate-risk 
issues. On the other hand, some of the investors choose to abandon the behind-scenes-approach 
and question management on a conference call about climate-risk issues (30%), publicly criticize 





(30%). A number of the investors (30%) vote at the annual meeting against management on 
proposals over climate issues. Smaller fractions vote against the re-election of any individual board 
directors due to climate-risk issues or take legal action against management over climate-related 
issues. 
Table 4 here 
The investors reported that they usually received a response to their engagement, although 
the response could be a simple acknowledgement of the engagement rather than any actions by the 
firm to respond to the investor’s concerns. The investors also indicated that if their engagement 
efforts were rebuffed, they typically did not escalate the engagement, try to hedge or divest from 
the firm. This lack of divestment due to failure of an engagement, combined with the lack of 
divestment for risk management purposes as discussed above, is striking given the ongoing debate 
regarding whether to divest from fossil fuel firms.  
In the survey, the question of stranded asset risks due to climate change was also explored 
at a deeper level by asking the respondents the following: ‘Responses to climate change may cause 
some assets to become ‘stranded’—i.e., unable to recover their investment cost, with a loss of 
value for investors. How large do you consider this risk in the following areas?’ Then a list of 
industries was provided which included coal producers, unconventional oil production (e.g., tar 
sands, fracking), conventional oil producers, natural gas producers, iron and steel producers, and 
conventional electricity producers. The results are provided in Table 6.5. The two industry sectors 
for which the largest percentage of respondents considered the risks to be very high were coal 
producers (25.1% of respondents) and unconventional oil producers (21.1%). In addition, 16.7 
percent of the investors thought that conventional oil producers have a very high risk of stranded 





might be surprising that only 25.1 percent of the investors thought that the stranded asset risk was 
high in the coal industry, it should also be noted that the average response to the question is 2.73 
(out of 4). This magnitude provides a stronger possibility that investors think stranded asset risk is 
high in the coal sector. There were also significant relations regarding the types of investor 
institutions who believe that the stranded asset risks are high in these sectors. For example, the 
investors more concerned about the financial effects of climate risks are the ones who believe that 
stranded asset risks are higher among oil and natural gas producers. In addition, for most of the 
sectors, investors who engage portfolio firms more over climate-risk topics, those with a higher 
share of investments under ESG principles, and those with a higher passive investment share, view 
stranded asset risks to be higher.  
Table 5 here 
The survey evidence by KSS shows that a number of investors engage with their portfolio 
firms on climate issues. To understand whether such engagement can reduce downside risks, 
Hoepner et al. (2021) employ proprietary data regarding the activities of a large investor, who 
specializes in engagements with firms on ESG issues for both its own account and those of others. 
Through an analysis of 1,712 engagements across 573 targets worldwide over the 2005-18 period, 
the authors find that a successful engagement typically takes about three years.  
The authors employ two measures to examine whether a shareholder engagement appears 
to affect the downside risk of the target firms. The first measure is the lower partial moment of the 
second order (LPM) using a zero percent-return-threshold, that is, the negative part of the return 
distribution of returns. The second measure is the investment’s value at risk (VaR). Using these 
measures in two different empirical approaches (difference-in-differences and factor model), the 





reductions in the target firms’ downside risk. They further find that engagement over 
environmental topics delivers the highest benefits in terms of downside risk reduction, and 
environmental engagements primarily feature the theme of climate change. This finding is 
consistent with the survey evidence in KSS, which indicates as discussed above that engagement 
over climate change is an important channel through which some institutions attempt to tackle 
climate-related risks. The results by Hoepner et al. (2021) suggests that such engagements have 
the potential to deliver substantial benefits for investors. Using the factor model approach, Hoepner 
et al. (2021) also find that the downside risk factor associated with a firm tends to decrease after 
at least partially successful engagements. Similar evidence is obtained by Dyck et al. (2019) who 
demonstrate that institutional investors are able to improve the ESG profiles of portfolio firms.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we discuss the implications of ESG risks for pension fund portfolios. We 
argue that the long-term horizons of pension funds exposes them to the long-lived effects of many 
ESG risks, especially those related to climate change. The potential consequences of being 
underfunded also leaves pension funds particularly exposed to ESG-related downside risks. We 
demonstrate how downside risks may affect pension funds in the face of climate change. We 
provide evidence showing that institutional investors think that climate risks are imminent today 
and have important financial implications for their portfolio firms. We also show that these risks 
are priced in financial markets. Finally, we present evidence on whether and how institutional 
investors address climate-related risks in the investment process. We show that the investors tend 
to prefer to employ risk management and engagement strategies, rather than divestment, to address 





processes to identify, measure, and manage ESG-related downside risks, especially those related 
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1 Some of the other authors cited in this paper use the terminology CSR (corporate social 
responsibility) rather than ESG. We use the term ESG throughout this paper rather than alternating 
between ESG and CSR. 
2 The composition of firms in the S&P 500, particularly the largest firms, has changed during the 
period. The top five firms in 1975 were IBM, Exxon, Procter & Gamble, General Electric and 3M. 
The top five firms in 2020 were Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, and Facebook. Obviously, 
the latter have significantly more of their assets in intangible assets.  
3 The agencies the EU cites as providing the controversy information are RepRisk, Bloomberg 
Environmental & Social News Sentiment Scores, MSCI ESG Controversies, Sustainalytics 
Controversies Research and Reports, ISS Country Controversy Assessment, and Vigeo Eiris 
Controversy Risk Assessment. 
4 See Gilbert and Kent (2015) and Gold (2019). 
5 See Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 
2019 on sustainability‐related disclosures in the financial services sector. 
6 In other tests on the relation between ESG scores and systematic risk, Oikonomou, Brooks, and 
Pavelin (2012) provide evidence that ESG/CSR performance is negatively but weakly related to 
systematic firm risk. They conclude that corporate social irresponsibility is positively and strongly 
related to financial risk. 
7 Some practitioners have a similar view on the systematic element of ESG risks. These 
practitioners maintain that since ESG are systematic risk factors, investing according to ESG risks 
would then be a form of smart beta. The implication of this view is that these risk factors are 





                                                                                                                                                             
mispriced and consequently, an investor could take advantage of this fact by constructing a 
portfolio with specific exposure to ESG risks. 
8 It should be noted that Murfin and Spiegel (2020) provide contrasting evidence. 
9 It should be noted that respondents with more sophisticated tools would have been more likely 
to participate in the survey. 
10 In a survey of institutional investors regarding their shareholder engagements, McCahery et al. 







Figure 1. Comparative importance of climate risks. 
 
Note: This figure reports the respondents’ rankings of six major investment risks. Respondents 
were asked to rank the six risks from one to six, where one is the most important risk and six the 
least important risk. The figure reports the percentages of respondents that rank a risk as the most 
important risk. 
 






















Table 1. Effects of carbon emission on downside risk 
        
Dependent variable: SlopeD  SlopeD SlopeD 
  (1) (2) (3) 
log(Scope 1/MV firm) 0.006***     
  (3.39)     
Residual log(Scope 1/MV firm)   0.003 0.005 
    (0.81) (1.06) 
log(Scope 1/MV industry)     0.006*** 
      (3.76) 
Model  Heckman Heckman Heckman 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year-by-quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Level Firm Firm Firm 
Frequency Monthly Monthly Monthly 
Obs. 18,664 18,664 18,664 
Adj. R2 n/a n/a n/a 
 
Note: This table reports regressions estimated at the firm-month level. SlopeD measures the 
steepness of the function that relates implied volatility to moneyness (measured by an option’s 
Black-Scholes delta) for OTM put options with 30 days maturity. Scope 1/MV firm are a firm’s 
Scope 1 carbon emissions (in metric tons of CO2) divided by the firm’s equity market value (in 
millions $). Scope 1/MV industry is the Scope 1 carbon intensity of all firms in the same industry 
(SIC4) and year. It is defined as total Scope 1 carbon emissions (metric tons of CO2) of all reporting 
firms in the industry divided by the total market capitalization of all reporting firms in the industry 
(in millions $). Residual log(Scope 1 MV/firm) is the residual of an OLS regression with log(Scope 
1/MV firm) as the dependent variable and log(Scope 1/MV industry) as the independent variable. 
The regressions in the table control for log(Assets), Dividends/net income, Debt/assets, 
EBIT/assets, CapEx/assets, Book-to-market, Returns, Institutional ownership, CAPM beta, 
Volatility, Oil beta, and a time trend (not reported). The sample includes all firms in the S&P 500 
with data on carbon emissions disclosed to CDP. The table estimates the effect of emissions 
generated between 2009 and 2016 on option market variables measured between November 2010 
and December 2017. t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by industry (SIC4) and year, 
are in parentheses. n/a, not applicable. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 





Table 2. Effect of 2016 Trump election on climate-related downside risk 
          










  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post Trump election x High Scope 1/MV Industry -0.025** -0.029** -0.025*** -0.020** 
 (-2.18) (-2.43) (-2.88) (-2.20) 
Scope 1/MV industry high 0.041* 0.043*   
 (1.67) (1.77)   
Post Trump election -0.025***   -0.022*** 
 (-4.63)   (-4.33) 
Model DiD DiD DiD DiD 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day fixed effects No Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes No 
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes 
Level Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Frequency Daily Daily Daily Daily 
Obs. 200,897 200,897 200,897 200,897 
Adj. R-sq. 0.062 0.091 0.294 0.184 
 
Note: This table reports regressions estimated at the firm-day level. Results are from difference-
in-differences regressions around the date of President Trump’s election on November 9, 2016. 
SlopeD measures the steepness of the function that relates implied volatility to moneyness 
(measured by an option’s Black-Scholes delta) for OTM put options with 30 days maturity. Post-
Trump election equals one for all days after President Trump’s election, and zero for all days before 
the election. Scope 1/MV industry high equals one for firms that operate in the top-10 industries 
based on Scope 1/MV industry, and zero otherwise. The regressions control for Effective tax rate, 
Effective tax rate x Post-Trump election, log(Assets), Dividends/net income, Debt/assets, 
EBIT/assets, CapEx/assets, Book-to-market, Returns, Institutional ownership, CAPM beta, 
Volatility, and Oil beta (not reported). The sample includes all firms in the S&P 500 with data on 
carbon emissions disclosed to CDP. t-statistics, based on standard errors double clustered by firm 
and day, are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 





Table 3. Climate-risk-management approaches 
      













(1) Analyzing carbon footprint of portfolio firms 38.0 4-14 
(2) Analyzing stranded asset risk 34.6 5-14 
(3) General portfolio diversification 33.9 6-14 
(4) ESG integration  31.7 6-14 
(5) Reducing carbon footprint of portfolio firms 29.3 1-2, 10-14 
(6) 
Firm valuation models that incorporate climate 
risk  25.9 1-4, 12-14 
(7) Use of third-party ESG ratings 25.6 1-4, 12-14 
(8) Shareholder proposals 25.1 1-4, 12-14 
(9) Hedging against climate risk 24.6 1-4, 13-14 
(10) Negative/exclusionary screening  23.7 1-5, 13-14 
(11) Reducing stranded asset risk 22.9 1-5, 13-14 
(12) Divestment 20.2 1-8, 12-14 
(13) None 7.1 1-12, 14 
(14) Other  3.7 1-13 
 
Note: This table reports the percentage of 410 respondents that in the previous five years took a 
given approach to incorporate climate risks into the investment process. Responses were not 
mutually exclusive. The table ranks results based on their relative frequency. Column (1) presents 
the percentage of respondents that took a certain measure. Column (2) reports the results of a t‐test 
of the null hypothesis that the percentage for a given approach is equal to the percentage for each 
of the other approaches, where only differences significant at the 10% level are reported. 
 





Table 4. Climate-risk engagement 
   








vs. rows  
 (1) (2) 
(1) Holding discussions with management regarding financial implications of climate risks  43 2-10 
(2) Proposing specific actions to management on climate-risk issues 32 1, 6-10 
(3) Voting against management on proposals over climate-risk issues at annual meeting 30 1, 6-10 
(4) Submitting shareholder proposals on climate-risk issues  30 1, 6-10 
(5) Questioning management on a conference call about climate-risk issues 30 1, 6-10 
(6) Publicly criticizing management on climate-risk issues  20 1-5, 9 
(7) Voting against re-election of any board directors due to climate-risk issues 19 1-5, 9 
(8) Legal action against management on climate-risk issues 18 1-5, 9 
(9) Other 1 1-8, 10 
(10) None 16 1-9 
 
Note: This table reports the percentage of 406 respondents that haven taken a particular approach of direct engagement over climate-
risk issues in the previous five years. The table ranks results based on their relative frequency. Responses were not mutually exclusive. 
Column (1) presents the percentage of respondents that took a certain approach. Column (2) reports the results of a t‐test of the null 
hypothesis that the percentage for a given approach is equal to the percentage for each of the other approaches, where significant 
differences at the 10% level are reported. 
 





Table 5. Stranded asset risk 
                





















Stranded asset risk (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (6) 
(1) Coal producers 25.1 2.78 3 371 *** 2-6 
(2) Unconventional oil producers 21.3 2.69 3 371 *** 1, 4-6 
(3) Conventional oil producers 16.7 2.64 4 371 *** 1, 4-6 
(4) Natural gas producers 11.9 2.46 3 370 *** 1-3, 5 
(5) Iron and steel producers 11.7 2.40 5 369 *** 1-4 
(6) Conventional electricity producers 10.5 2.42 4 371 *** 1-3 
 
Note: This table reports the investors’ responses to the question of how large they consider the risk 
that climate change causes some assets to become stranded, that is, unable to recover their 
investment cost, with a loss of value for investors. The survey listed six industries for which the 
respondents were asked to evaluate this risk. Respondents could indicate their views on a scale of 
one (‘low’) through four (‘very high’). They could also indicate ‘Do not know’. Column (1) 
presents the percentage of respondents indicating that stranded asset risk is ‘very high’. The table 
ranks results based on this measure. Column (2) reports the mean score, where higher values 
correspond to higher stranded asset risk. Column (3) presents the percentage of respondents 
indicating ‘Do not know.’ Column (4) reports the number of respondents. Column (5) reports the 
results of a t‐test of the null hypothesis that each mean score is equal to 1 (low stranded asset risk). 
Column (6) reports the results of a t‐test of the null hypothesis that the mean score for a given 
reason is equal to the mean score for each of the other reasons, where significant differences at the 
10% level are reported. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors that are 
clustered at the investor-country level. ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
Source: Krueger et al. (2020), Table 10.  
